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Mackie’s Argument for the Infinite Man
Abigail Jeanne Basile
I.

Introduction

Many of the issues regarding the existence of the Judeo-Christian God revolve
around some contradiction between one of His necessary attributes and the
existence of evil. One of the common explanations of evil’s occurrence is the idea
that God does not actually have omnipotence, since if He did He easily could stop
evil from affecting His creation. Philosopher J. L. Mackie argues that the
possibility for human beings to choose evil keeps them from being able to
continually practice goodness, and thus there should not be an option for man to
exercise his free will to choose evil. Instead, man should have been created so that
he is guided in his free will to always choose the good, so as to avoid evil
altogether. Mackie goes further to claim that since this is not man’s reality, God
must not be powerful enough to actualize this, and this calls His omnipotence, and
thus His existence, into question. Although Mackie contends that the presence of
evil is evidence for the lack of omnipotence in the Judeo-Christian God, I argue
that, God, in all His power, cannot create non-finite humans that do not have
natural limitations in knowledge and power. Further, if man has free will, his
inevitable finitude makes the presence of evil highly probable. Therefore, the
presence of evil does not challenge God’s omnipotence or existence.
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II. Mackie’s Argument
Acclaimed philosopher J.L. Mackie gives a strong argument against the
existence of God in his article “Evil & Omnipotence,” stating that there is a
contradiction between the existence of evil and God’s attribute of omnipotence.
Mackie argues that since it is logically possible for man to prefer what is good
instead of what is evil and to choose it on at least one occasion, then it should not
be logically contradictory for him to choose the good on all occasions.1 If
mankind has free will, which Mackie argues is the case, and if God is truly
omnipotent, then it would be possible for God to guide His free agents to choose
good every time, thus keeping evil out of the world and suffering apart from His
creation. God’s adamant effort and desire to keep evil and suffering out of the
world would come from His omnibenevolence. Since there is evil and suffering,
Mackie’s conclusion is that God must not be able to prevent evil and suffering or
He must not want to, so He is either not omnipotent, not omnibenevolent, or both.
If He lacks either of these qualities, then the Judeo-Christian God does not exist.
This paper focuses on Mackie’s treatment of the omnipotence and limitations
of God. Mackie contends that God being all-powerful means that He is
completely limitless, and this includes His dealings with mankind and its

J. L. Mackie, “Evil & Omnipotence,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord
Adams, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33.
1
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choices.2 Some theodicies portray free will as a solution to the problem of evil,
concluding that evil finds its foundation in man’s choices instead of God Himself.
However, Mackie contends that the way God gave men and women free will sets
them up for failure because it still allows individuals the ability to consciously
choose evil. Instead of allowing this, God, in all His power, should have created
man with the ability to always freely choose good over evil. If God had decided
upon this option, it would keep evil out of the world and traumatic suffering
would never harm mankind.

III.

Regulated Free Will

Mackie does not just argue that free will is a barrier to man’s ability to do
good, but he goes further to say that God should have taken the initiative to create
mankind with a free will that causes people to only choose the good.3 Mackie
contends that free will cannot rest upon pure random volition, so there must be
some kind of predictable system that guides mankind’s free will. If the exercise of
free will was truly random, the agent could not self-determine his or her own
actions whatsoever, negating any “characteristic of the will.”4 Since free will
cannot be totally random, God should have made “a decision to make men… such

2

Mackie, 32-33.

3

Mackie, 34-35.

4

Mackie, 34.
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that they would always freely go right.”5 Such a guided free will would keep evil
away and would easily be within God’s omnipotent ability in the creation of man.
Because there are so many opportunities for man to fail by choosing evil, Mackie
argues that the mere ability to choose evil leads inevitably to man’s sinful demise.
Paul K. Moser, a Christian theist, affirms Mackie’s point in discussing man’s
inability to keep the moral law through his own efforts by saying, “Left to our
own devices, of course, we are all soon dead and buried… Our self-supplied
resources, cognitive and otherwise, bring us fully to naught, leaving us with no
genuine hope for our own lasting future.”6 Moser emphasizes that man’s natural
limitations deter man in his ability to accomplish a continual goodness on his
own, thus man will almost inevitably face evil and suffering from his inability to
continually do good. Mackie, however, assumes that God should have created
mankind to only experience and produce goodness, because otherwise mankind is
harmed. If left to its own means, mankind’s accomplishment of goodness is
sporadic and inconsistent, so Mackie applies a point on which he and Moser agree
to argue that God should provide a guide away from evil to ensure man
continuously does only good.
With the type of guided free will Mackie suggests, however, one can quickly
inquire whether or not this is actually free will. Yes, mankind would be free to

5

Mackie, 34.

6

Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99.
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choose the good and right choice, but it does not seem to actually be a choice if
individuals are only able to choose good. Mackie is correct to assume that God is
more than sufficiently omnipotent to keep mankind from choosing evil, and that
would prima facie be beneficial for mankind to avoid suffering, but this scenario
does not allow true free will. A necessary component of making a choice with
free will is that there is actually a choice to make, meaning that there are two
options, or even scenarios, that an individual must decide between. If God guides
a person’s actions so that he only decides upon the good option every time, the
decision cannot be attributed to the person since there was no other option
available to him. There is no choice in Mackie’s version of free will, thus it
cannot be considered an adequate account of free will.
Even if an individual can exert choice between varying levels of goodness,
like in David Hume’s world where man only experiences pleasure, the only
“choice” is a default option of goodness, which commits the same fallacy
identified in Mackie’s argument mentioned above.7 Hume’s world allows
goodness and pleasure to be experienced, but it cannot make mankind moral.
Man’s utopia where he can only choose goodness and experience pleasure is
theoretically ideal for the purpose of avoiding evil and suffering, but the benefits
of such a world stop there. There is no robust knowledge of goodness if a person
can only choose the good without weighing the consequences of evil. A person
7

David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1998), 58-66.
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who is able to identify evil and suffering can purposefully make a choice to not
replicate it in his or her life or circumstances, therefore bettering his or her overall
existence as a moral human being. Neither Hume’s world nor Mackie’s free will
allows for this.
St. Augustine acknowledges that with free will man has the ability to choose
evil over good and that choosing evil indeed produces negative consequences as
well as distance in a relationship with God.8 However, being able to choose good
over evil within free will allows one to choose the good because it is good, not
because he or she is forced by a determined will. Augustine concludes that though
God’s choice to give man free will does allow the possibility for evil to occur, it
also allows man the ability to practice moral goodness. Alvin Plantinga follows
Augustine’s lead and writes in God, Freedom and Evil,
“To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore He must
create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these
creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent
them from doing so… The fact that free creatures sometimes go
wrong, however, counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor
against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence
of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.”9
Both Augustine and Plantinga show that free will enables mankind to practice
morality in the choice between good and evil, and this is more beneficial than
8
Augustine of Hippo, On Free Choice Of The Will, trans. Thomas Williams
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co, 1993), 64.
9

Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Williams B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2008), 30.
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always being forced to do good. For people to be morally good, it would mean
that they exercise reasoning to make self-conscious choices in favor of the good
over the evil. It is within the omnipotence of God to create beings incapable of
moral evil, but He cannot force them to be morally good.

IV. The Turning Point in Mackie’s Argument
Freedom allows one to make an intentional decision in choosing to act based
on the goodness of an action, so that one chooses the action because it is good.
Mackie’s argument revolves around the idea that since man, acting within his free
will, can choose the good and right choice on at least one occasion, it logically
follows that man could choose the good and right choice on every occasion.10
Mackie writes,
“I should ask this: If God has made men such that in their free
choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is
evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely
choose the good? If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s
freely choosing the good on one, or on several, occasions, there
cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on
every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between
making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting
freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the
obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely
but always go right.”11
If mankind naturally prefers to do what is morally good, it would seem that God
should curve their free will to always choose the good. According to Mackie, God
10

Mackie, 33.

11

Mackie, 33.
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is theoretically powerful enough to influence man’s free will and have him always
prefer the right choice, making him more inclined to do it. Mackie thinks that,
intrinsically, individuals want to practice goodness, but their limited ability to
actualize this in their finitude is the cause of their practicing evil.
Though Mackie’s argument may initially seem valid, there are details that
prove Mackie’s argument to be quite unsound. He argues that there are times
within free will where people “sometimes prefer what is good,” and makes a leap
to say that the internal desire for good can cause a man to actually choose the
good every time.12 This lofty assertion makes assumptions about man’s abilities
that are contrary to what is actually possible within his finitude. The problem with
Mackie’s argument is that he thinks too highly of man and too little of God. To
explain man’s lack of abilities within his finitude, there first needs to be an
examination of God’s infinity.

V.

God’s Limited Infinity

Two of the essential attributes of the theistic God is that He is both infinite
and necessary for the existence of all contingent beings, including mankind. Some
view God’s being infinite as a negative attribute for God to have due to an
obvious disconnection between Him and His finite creation. Just as the beauty of
a music piece speaks directly of the talent of its composer, all of creation is
supposed to speak directly of the abilities of its Creator. However, philosopher
12

Mackie, 33.
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Roger Montague and physicist Richard Dawkins both look at the world and claim
that if it did have a Creator, He is inept, limited, and His creation does not reflect
any omnipotence. Dawkins argues in The God Delusion that any existing
complexity demands its source to be found in an even greater complexity, which
leads him to argue that the theory of an infinite, complex, “end-all-be-all” God is
extremely unlikely.13 He says that all of creation is a poor excuse for showing the
magnitude of God, especially the characteristic of His omnipotence. Nothing
finite can remotely give the appropriate reflection of the infinite. Montague writes
that if God’s very creation is supposed to imitate Him, then God seems weak,
limited, and susceptible to destruction.14 The most tangible things that can and
should reflect God’s power make Him seem the opposite of omnipotent. In these
arguments, Dawkins and Montague seem to suggest that the only creation
appropriate to reflect the work of an infinite creator must also be infinite and
perfect.
The problem with this argument is that to create anything that would
adequately reflect His magnitude, God would have to create an identical version
of Himself. This is impossible based on the definition of what it means to be
created. The created god would immediately differ from the actual God since he

13
Richard Dawkins. The God Delusion. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Trade
& Reference Publishers, 2008), 138-9.

Roger Montague. “Dawkin’s Infinite Regress,” Philosophy 83, no. 323 (2008): 113-15.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20185290.
14
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would be as contingent and finite as any other creation. All created things are
necessarily finite, therefore it is impossible for God to create the infinite.
A theistic argument claiming there to be logical limits in God’s omnipotence
is neither inappropriate nor a contradiction. Theist Ronald Nash argues that God
is a factually necessary being, meaning that without God’s factuality the laws of
the universe go on unexplained.15 God’s omnipotence is often thought of as truly
unlimited, but Nash argues that His omnipotence should be conceived with
natural limitations. God is able to will and do anything that does not involve a
contradiction in the laws of nature that He instantiated. For example, if God
created a married bachelor, He would be creating something that is logically
contradictory to the definition of what a bachelor is. This is not to argue that God
is unable to do unprecedented miracles in nature that are out of the ordinary, but
that there are natural limitations based on the definitional function of certain
things. Man being created necessitates his finitude, and creatureness is essential
to the definition of man. Man could not be man without also being finite. The fact
that man is unable to use infinite knowledge, power, and goodness to avoid
practicing evil is not evidence of God’s lack of omnipotence but is evidence of
man’s existence. Within all of God’s infinite power, He cannot create a finite man
with infinite abilities in knowledge, power, and goodness.

15

Ronald H Nash, The Concept Of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Pub. House,

1983), 37.
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Thomas Aquinas goes further to argue that these definitional essences in
creation are eternal as they are derived from the mind and nature of God. Thomas
writes, “Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made
by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of
those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government.”16
The essences of each created thing come from God who “bears the character of
law,” so that the things He created are a direct correlation to His nature as the
“artificer.”17 If God created outside of these laws, He would be creating in a way
that contradicts His very being, which, if He is infinite and immutable, is
contradictory altogether. It is impossible for infinite to create infinite. God
created consistently according to the laws of nature He instantiated because it is in
congruence with His nature.

VI.

Man’s Infinite Finitude

Mackie’s main frustration seems to be that God did not create mankind to
always choose the good and right choice in every circumstance. Because God did
not do this, mankind experiences evil and suffering that any good God would
want His creation to avoid completely. To Mackie, God is not powerful enough to
guide man’s free will towards the good, and God is not good enough to keep His

16
Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica, Question 93, Article 1” – Christian Classics
Ethereal Library, last modified 2005, accessed May 9, 2018.
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FS_Q93_A1.html.
17

Aquinas, Question 93, Article 1.
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creation away from suffering, therefore He must not exist. However, it is not clear
that the limitations imposed by the nature of humanity allow humans the capacity
to always choose the good. If man were to use his free will so that he actually
chooses the good and right choice every time, it would require that he have
perfect knowledge of what is good and perfect power so that he can actually do
the good. By the term perfect, it is implied that there is a level of infinity within
both qualities of knowledge and power. Man must have all the knowledge needed
to identify the good choice, and all the power so that, as long as it is actually
possible, man can accomplish the good choice before him. Infinite knowledge
would be necessary so that the good could be known as inherently good in all
possible worlds and at all possible times. The infinite power to implement the
good would be necessary lest man be unable to actualize the good.
As discussed earlier, God cannot create in a way that follows certain laws of
nature at one point and then not at another. G.W. Leibniz speaks of God being the
source of every essence and existent being and posits that there are metaphysical
necessities in logical laws that God has both defined and adhered to in creation.18
Leibniz writes, “we observe that everything in the world takes place in
accordance with the laws that are eternally true, laws that are not merely
geometrical, but metaphysical, that is, not only in accordance with the material

18

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and Older Essays, trans. Daniel
Garber and Rodger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991), 44.
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necessities, but also in accordance with formal reasons.”19 Leibniz makes the
observation that within science there are necessary laws of logic that must be
followed in the consistency of the universe for things to function. William Hasker
interacts with the idea of God’s limitations in Leibniz, saying that simply because
a world may be “logically possible” does not mean that it is “actually
creatable.”20 If God created regardless of laws and order, He would be
implementing a sporadic pattern of chaos that repudiates His all-knowingness, allpowerfulness, as well as all-goodness.
Whether it is the law of motion, logical necessity, or any of metaphysical
necessity, there are patterned consistencies that are repetitive throughout the
universe. Mankind is no exception to natural laws, but rather is actually governed
by these laws. Mankind is definitionally finite, so Mackie’s demand that he
practice infinity within his free will is contradictory to what man is actually able
to accomplish.

VIII. Conclusion
Mackie’s argument is persuasive, but it simply asks too much of man in
demanding that he function with infinite qualities within his finite nature. Since it

19

Leibniz, 45.

William Hasker, “‘Can God Be Free?’: Rowe’s Dilemma for Theology,” Religious
Studies 41, no. 4 (2005), 461.
20
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is man who is necessarily limited in his ability to know and do good, it would
seem a highly probable conclusion that the existence of evil is due solely to the
fact that mankind is naturally unable to always make a good and right choice over
an evil one within free will. The mere potential for mankind to always choose the
good and right choice over an evil one cannot translate to an actual ability to do
so. Just as it is impossible for a person to function outside of his nature of
finitude, it is impossible for God to create any finite being with infinite
capabilities. This is not because of a lack of omnipotence from God, but because
it would be logically contradictory as finite man is unavoidably limited in his
abilities of knowledge, power, and goodness. It seems that the presence of evil is
all but inevitable if man was to operate within his truly free will, not because of
God’s lack of omnipotence, but because of the natural limitations of man’s
finitude.
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